Date: Friday, January 20, 2023 13:30 to 15:00
＊This seminar will be held as a Zoom Meeting.
Please contact【yuri-kitabayashi(a)iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp 】in advance, if you want to participate in the meeting.
(Faculty of Management and Governance, Shumei University)
Title: “Red-Tape Incentives in Oligopoly ( joint with Keita Kamei )”
This study deals with the issue of red-tape barriers (RTBs), which is recently discussed by the OECD and WTO, using a simple oligopolistic trade model. Taking not only the tariff rate decisions but also RTBs decisions into account, we obtain the following results: (i) Under a free trade agreement (FTA), governments have an incentive for RTBs when the number of foreign firms is relatively small, but the incentive decreases as the number of foreign firms increases. These results suggest that when concluding an FTA, if incentives for RTBs are not taken into consideration at the same time, welfare may rather deteriorate, and further it is necessary to pay attention to domestic and international competitive levels. Abstract：Kentaro Inomata
- 共催：東京大学社会科学研究所 & IPP研究会
- 問合せ： 東京大学社会科学研究所 中林真幸研究室