Osaka Workshop on Economics of Institutions and Organization (#134)

This paper proposes a method for identifying quantitative and qualitative monetary policy shocks in the balance sheet operations of a central bank. The method is agnostic and flexible as it relies on no assumptions on how the size and composition of the central bank’s balance sheet will respond after the bank makes a policy decision. We identify two types of policy shocks as “anticipated” shocks that best portend the current and future paths of these policy instruments in response to them. We obtain evidence that qualitative easing shocks have expansionary effects on the economy while quantitative easing shocks do not.Abstract: Masahiko Shibamoto

We study a new class of finitely repeated games with optional monitoring, where each player automatically receives complete information about the other players’ actions with some exogenously given probability. Only when the automatic information did not arrive, the player privately decides whether to exercise a costless monitoring option or not. We show that a weak decrease in the vector of the players’ probabilities of automatic monitoring is a necessary and sufficient condition for any repeated game with automatic and optional monitoring to have a weakly greater sequential equilibrium payoff vector set. This result considerably strengthens our earlier result, which only compares purely optional monitoring and the standard model of purely automatic monitoring. We also provide examples where existing folk theorems hold under any automatic and optional monitoring structure but not under the standard model.Abstract: Yasuyuki Miyahara