日時: 2021年10月15日(金)13:30 ~ 15:00
開催方法: オンラインにて開催
申込: rmikami(a)iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp(中林研究室 三上様宛)
Presenter:
Junichiro Ishida(石田潤一郎 大阪大学)
Title: “Signaling under double-crossing preferences”
This paper provides a general analysis of signaling under double-crossing preferences with a continuum of types. There are natural economic environments where the indifference curves of two types cross twice, such that the celebrated single-crossing property fails to hold. Equilibrium exhibits a threshold type below which types choose actions that are fully revealing and above which they pool in a pairwise fashion, with a gap separating the actions chosen by these two sets of types. The resulting signaling action is quasi-concave in type. We also provide an algorithm to establish equilibrium existence by construction. Abstract:Junichiro Ishida
- 共催:東京大学社会科学研究所 & IPP研究会
- お問い合わせ:東京大学社会科学研究所 中林真幸研究室 詳しくはこちら