- 場所：大阪大学豊中キャンパス OSIPP棟 6階会議室
講師：山下拓朗 氏（Toulouse School of Economics）
議題：“Speculators enhancing Transparency in Auction”
A (pure) speculator in an auction context is a bidder who participates in an auction to make a profit but without winning, observed in practice typically in auctions with resale. Given that speculators could potentially steal some rents from “real” bidders possibly by upsetting allocations, it is an important policy question whether speculators should be allowed to participate in an auction. In this paper, I consider a bilateral-trade (or “double-auction”) environment where a deficit-constrained principal (e.g., a public authority) can acquire information crucial for the efficiency of trading outcomes. I show that it is welfare-maximizing to fully acquire and disclose information in the auction with a speculator, while such full-information policy is strictly suboptimal without a speculator. Because of this information channel, allowing for a speculator can increase the expected total welfare. In this sense, the paper provides a rationale for allowing for a speculator in certain auction contexts to enhance the welfare and transparency.
議題：“A Crash Course in Cooperative Game Theory”
This seminar is meant to familiarize the participants with some fundamental concepts and results in the theory of cooperative games. In particular, I cover theory and background of classical cooperative solutions such as the core, the bargaining set, and the nucleolus.