第127回「制度と組織の経済学」研究会 (共催：IPP研究会）

• 日時：2019年5月31日（金）13:00-16:10
• 場所：大阪大学豊中キャンパス　OSIPP棟　 6階会議室

 

 

A (pure) speculator in an auction context is a bidder who participates in an auction to make a profit but without winning, observed in practice typically in auctions with resale. Given that speculators could potentially steal some rents from “real” bidders possibly by upsetting allocations, it is an important policy question whether speculators should be allowed to participate in an auction. In this paper, I consider a bilateral-trade (or “double-auction”) environment where a deficit-constrained principal (e.g., a public authority) can acquire information crucial for the efficiency of trading outcomes. I show that it is welfare-maximizing to fully acquire and disclose information in the auction with a speculator, while such full-information policy is strictly suboptimal without a speculator. Because of this information channel, allowing for a speculator can increase the expected total welfare. In this sense, the paper provides a rationale for allowing for a speculator in certain auction contexts to enhance the welfare and transparency.

 

 

This seminar is meant to familiarize the participants with some fundamental concepts and results in the theory of cooperative games. In particular, I cover theory and background of classical cooperative solutions such as the core, the bargaining set, and the nucleolus.

 

• 共催：IPP研究会（ http://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/ipp/index.html ）
• お問い合わせ：東京大学社会科学研究所 中林真幸研究室