[5月15日開催] The 176th「制度と組織の経済学」研究会 / Akifumi Ishihara (Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo)

Presenter: Akifumi Ishihara (Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo)
Title: “Managing Strategic Communication for Monetary Transfers”

Date: Friday, 15 May 2026, 13:30–15:00

Venue: Zoom meeting
Registration: yuri-kitabayashi [at] iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp（東京大学中林研究室 北林様宛)

Abstract: We investigate a model of an informed expert and an uninformed decision maker, in which the expert sends cheap-talk messages and can voluntarily make monetary transfers. By strategically ignoring some advice, the decision maker can induce the expert to make transfers as costly signalling. Consequently, fully revealing communication is not optimal for the decision maker, even when the parties have a common interest. In the canonical uniform-quadratic environment with an upwardly biased expert, we explicitly characterize an optimal equilibrium: pooling among low types and separation among high types. Comparative statics suggest that a more biased expert can make the decision maker better off by strengthening the expert’s incentive to signal through transfers.

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The meeting is organized in collaboration with International Public Policy Seminar