[10月16日開催] The 179th「制度と組織の経済学」研究会 / Hideshi Itoh (Graduate School of Business and Finance, Waseda University)

Presenter: Hideshi Itoh (Graduate School of Business and Finance, Waseda University)
Title: “Effort and Incentive Pay in Retail Managers” (joint with Desmond (Ho-Fu) Lo, Chieko Minami, and Ruo Shangguan)

Date: Friday, 16 October 2026, 13:30–15:00
Venue: Only in-person at Conference Room, 6th floor,
　　　　　OSIPP (Osaka School of International Public Policy) Building, Toyonaka Campus
　　　　　（大阪大学豊中キャンパス OSIPP 棟6階 会議室）

Registration: Please email Ms. Kitabayashi (yuri-kitabayashi [at] iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp)
東京大学社会科学研究所中林研究室 北林様宛

Abstract: This paper studies how superiors’ effort combines with incentive pay to motivate subordinates’ effort. We develop a principal–agent model that distinguishes the superior’s effort into two kinds: monitoring, aimed at checking the subordinate’s behavior, and supervision, aimed at enhancing his productivity. We test its implications using observations on store managers and their subordinate department managers from a large retailer. The evidence is broadly consistent with the model’s predictions: monitoring and incentive pay interact negatively in generating sales performance, whereas supervisory effort and incentive pay interact positively. Our study underscores the importance of distinguishing the principal’s effort in settings where incentive pay motivates agent effort.

The Osaka Workshop on Economics of Institutions and Organizations　 https://sites.google.com/site/theoeio/Home

The meeting is organized in collaboration with International Public Policy Seminar