Both Japan and South Korea have focused on projects such as water management, human development, and technology such as early warning systems for disasters. However, it’s not clear what each country is actually doing in the region, since the information is not publicized. The first step is to create an information sharing center to identify ongoing projects and areas of overlap between Japan and Korea. A cooperative framework within existing institutions like ASEAN could create a forum for this.
Mr. Koga proposed this idea based on the experience of Japan-China cooperation in the past. In 2006-2010, the two countries communicated bilaterally and shared information on Mekong development programs, but lines of communication ultimately collapsed because of politicization. This shows that in bilateral relations, channels of communication can be built, but politicization can cut off these channels. Using an existing multilateral framework can preserve the lines of communication more effectively. Additionally, external powers like Japan and Korea could be effective in putting Mekong on the agenda for ASEAN in general.
In the beginning, the Quad was molded almost in reaction to what China was doing. Its shift to a focus on infrastructure development and vaccines show that the Quad is no longer ignoring Southeast Asia. A Quad+ format could be flexible in including other countries, but its potential depends on how US stance towards China is going to evolve.
Under the Biden administration, the fundamental US posture towards China has remained same as Trump administration, but the middle powers, such as Japan and South Korea, are not aligning themselves with the US approach to China. This could be their strength – they have the same democratic principles and values as the US, but are more open to communication and collaboration with China. This could give them room to approach other countries, facilitating their ability to promote the rule of law and human rights in ASEAN.
The main incentive for improving Japan-Korea bilateral relations is intensification of US-China strategic competition. In this context, the Mekong region is becoming more geopolitically important, creating divisions in the region which are not good for ASEAN or South Korea. Similarly, Japan aligning more closely with the US would create division among ASEAN member states, which wouldn’t be strategically beneficial for Japan.
Japan and South Korea, through collaboration, have an opportunity to mitigate US-China geopolitical competition over Mekong region development. Both countries want to see more ASEAN autonomy in East Asia, and share strategic interests to cooperate even if they don’t perfectly align.
There is no single coherent European approach to the Indo-Pacific; different ideas exist within the EU, not just between the UK and the EU. There is economic competition between European countries in their Indo-Pacific region ventures, but that was present when UK was in the EU as well. What has changed is that the current government in the UK came to power on the Brexit policy and is expected to deliver on the idea of British influence extending far beyond Europe – for example, by joining trade agreements in Asia such as the CPTPP. This does not inhibit the EU in its policy toward the Indo-Pacific, and the EU’s success will be determined by other factors. Additionally, as the Biden administration opens to more collaboration with allies, the EU is finding a better partner in Washington than in the past. This means the difference between the EU and UK in terms of willingness to algin with the US is decreasing, showing movement toward harmonization of interests.