



The Post-Exile Fate of Leaders: A New Dataset

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【Abstract】 With the recent development of datasets on political leaders, there has been a growing body of research on the punishment of leaders, such as exile, imprisonment, and execution. Unlike execution and imprisonment, however, exile does not necessarily lead to a disastrous end. Nevertheless, previous studies have focused only on the treatment of leaders at the point of loss of power and have lumped exile together with other punishments. In other words, prior studies have focused too short a time span as the fate of leaders. Therefore, by constructing a unique dataset that tracks the fate of exiled leaders over a longer period of time, this study systematically and comprehensively investigated whether exile actually serves as punishment or not. Specifically, it examined whether exiled leaders were able to return to their home countries, if so, how they were treated after their return, and whether their lives in exile were favorable. The analysis revealed that the fates of the leaders after exile were extremely diverse and that exile does not generally function as punishment. Thus, existing studies that have lumped exile together with other punishments need to be significantly revised.

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Abstract

With the recent development of datasets on political leaders, there has been a growing body of research on the punishment of leaders, such as exile, imprisonment, and execution. Unlike execution and imprisonment, however, exile does not necessarily lead to a disastrous end. Nevertheless, previous studies have focused only on the treatment of leaders at the point of loss of power and have lumped exile together with other punishments. In other words, prior studies have focused too short a time span as the fate of leaders. Therefore, by constructing a unique dataset that tracks the fate of exiled leaders over a longer period of time, this study systematically and comprehensively investigated whether exile actually serves as punishment or not. Specifically, it examined whether exiled leaders were able to return to their home countries, if so, how they were treated after their return, and whether their lives in exile were favorable. The analysis revealed that the fates of the leaders after exile were extremely diverse and that exile does not generally function as punishment. Thus, existing studies that have lumped exile together with other punishments need to be significantly revised.

Introduction

There are a variety of post-tenure fates awaiting a leader when they lose their power after a coup d'état or popular uprising. There is a dataset—a well-known classification—in which the post-tenure fates of leaders have been subjected to coding wherein their fates have been separated into suffering no negative consequences at all (i.e., “OK”) or punishments such as exile, imprisonment, and execution (Goemans et al. 2009).

These post-tenure fates attracted attention when it was realized that they are variables that explain a variety of political phenomena. In conventional political science, it is assumed that the priority of leaders is maintaining their powers; correspondingly, a variety of theories have been created based on this assumption (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2002; 2003). In contrast, a new concept has been proposed in which it is no longer assumed that leaders are most interested in whether they can maintain their office, but rather, whether their safety can be guaranteed after they lose power. This is because it has been pointed out that many political phenomena can be better explained when this premise is assumed (Goemans 2000; Chiozza and Goemans 2011; Weeks 2014).

After considering the various fates that befall leaders, we decided to focus on exile for this paper. As mentioned above, along with imprisonment and execution, exile is generally categorized as a type

of punishment. Accordingly, numerous quantitative analyses have coded cases with exile, imprisonment, or execution as forms of “punishment,” indicating that most analyses group these three together. However, when compared to imprisonment and execution, exile has been found to be clearly different in substance from the other two in that it is not a penalty that is imposed by the nation or the new regime. For leaders, exile is not necessarily a harsh fate; specifically, it can be viewed as either a good fate or a bad fate depending upon the actual circumstances. For instance, Makarios III of Cyprus, who was ousted from power in a coup in 1974, was greeted “not as the former President of Cyprus but as the elected President of Cyprus” in his exile in the United Kingdom (*New York Times*, July 18, 1974). While in exile, he aroused the international community by appealing for a solution to the Cyprus problem at the UN Security Council (*New York Times*, July 19, 1974). Subsequently, he succeeded in bringing down the military regime in his homeland that had ousted him, returning home as president just five months after the coup. On the other hand, a clear example of a bad fate after exile is that of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who lost power during the Tunisian Revolution in 2011. After his downfall, Ben Ali was denied asylum by France and later fled to Saudi Arabia, where he rarely appeared in the media during his exile because of a ban on political activities. While in exile, he was prosecuted and sentenced to life in prison for the murder of protesters in Tunisia; ultimately, he died of cancer in September 2019 in his exile without ever returning home. Thus, there is a great variety of “post-exile” scenarios. In that sense, exile is greatly different from imprisonment and execution, both of which can only be considered devastating.

Therefore, if there are many exile scenarios that lead to a good fate, then there is a need to reevaluate the existing theory that exile should be grouped together with imprisonment and execution as forms of “punishment.” In this sense, there is academic value in elucidating the actualities of exile. In fact, there is a need to empirically describe “the aftermath of exile.”

While previous studies on the post-tenure fate of leaders have mainly focused on the problem of the variety of effects the post-tenure fate has on a leader’s behavior, the time span of the “post-tenure fate” which was considered for this purpose was too short. Specifically, previous studies have only focused on the point in time when power has been lost. In the case of execution or imprisonment, which can only be thought of as devastating, this would not be a problem. However, if we attempt to study exile by examining life after exile over a longer time span, then we cannot be sure that exile has continued to function as a form of punishment. In fact, leaders who have lost power have themselves interpreted the effects of exile over a longer time span.

Based on the above issues, we created a unique dataset regarding the post-exile period and the subsequent fate of leaders. Furthermore, we addressed the question whether, in reality, exile works as a punishment or not. In other words, what percentage of exiles are blessed and what percentage are not? Then, of course, the critical point in dealing with this question is what constitutes a blessed exile. In this paper, we will attempt to measure this from several points of view, with the main axis among

them being whether the exiled leaders were able to return home after their exile. This is because it can be objectively measured, the data on it is fairly available, and furthermore, exiled leaders often wish to return to their countries.

The conclusion from the dataset is that the fates after exile are diverse. Apparently, in some cases exile serves as a punishment and in others it does not. Therefore, it is necessary to reconsider previous research that has uniformly viewed exile as a punishment.

1. Exile in previous studies

Post-tenure fate research has flourished in recent years. A variety of theories are based on the premise that leaders do not prioritize maintaining their position in office, but rather prioritize avoiding “punishments” such as exile, execution, and imprisonment after losing power. This is because one can better explain the behavior of leaders and the foreign policies of nations when they use this premise. Specifically, these behaviors include whether a leader engages in armed conflict with another country (Chiozza and Goemans 2011; Debs and Goemans 2010; Frantz et al. 2014; Weeks 2014; Croco 2015), ends a war in progress (Goemans 2000), and gives up power and progresses toward democratization (Sutter 2000).

In addition, studies in which post-tenure fate is used as the dependent variable and the factors that determine this are investigated are also being conducted with increasing frequency (Goemans 2008; Anderson 2010; Chiozza and Goemans 2011; Wright and Escribà-Folch 2012; Escribà-Folch 2013; Albertus and Menaldo 2014; Albertus 2019; Radtke 2020). These have led to the identification of poor economic performance and the length of the term of office as being among the factors which may cause a bad fate.

Nearly without exception, these studies regard exile as a form of “punishment” along with execution and imprisonment. In quantitative analyses as well, if any of these three occur, then the item concerning whether a leader has been “punished” is assigned a response of “1” (i.e., “yes”).

However, simultaneously, it has been pointed out that exile is fundamentally different from the other two and that exile should be recognized, not as a punishment, but as a good fate. Radtke (2020) pointed out that leaders “flee into exile in order to ensure that they do not face a worse fate: death or imprisonment” (p. 339). In addition, Escribà-Folch (2013) pointed out that to realize a peaceful regime change, it is necessary for an ex-ruler to go into exile and be granted asylum in another country so as to ensure their safety (p. 162). Furthermore, Krcmaric (2018) stated that “exile provides a mechanism for leaders, especially those facing domestic unrest, to give up power in a relatively costless manner” (p.487). However, as stated previously, even as the fundamental different nature of exile continues to be pointed out, exile is grouped together with imprisonment and execution when actual analyses are conducted. Indeed, no studies have conducted an empirical investigation of the aftermath of exile.

On the other hand, although relatively few in number, there have been studies on the concept of exile itself that have reported highly intriguing trends as a result of their detailed analyses. For example, Escribà-Folch and Krcmaric (2017) analyzed the kinds of countries that are selected as destinations for exile. Their results showed that geographic distance and transnational connection between states – such as whether an alliance exists or whether a colony-imperial state relationship exists – are factors that determine the selection of a destination for exile. Krcmaric (2018, 2020) pointed out that the reason for a decrease in cases of exile since the latter half of the 1990s is a norm change that occurred in the international community toward seeking responsibility for human rights violations; that is, a so-called “justice cascade” has occurred. By this logic, exiles have declined since a leader can no longer have their safety guaranteed by going into exile in another country in the age of the justice cascade. While this is certainly an important subject of scholarship, its focus of analysis is the time point at which power is lost rather than the fate of the leader after exile.

In fact, as subsequent data has shown, there are leaders who are subject to diverse fates after exile. For a variety of reasons, there are both “happy” exiles and those that are not. Although it is not a direct analysis, one previous study (Krcmaric 2018; 2020) presented an important point of view on this issue. Specifically, it dealt with the effect of human rights violations on exile. Certainly, one intuitively understands that in a country in which large-scale human rights violations have taken place, the exile awaiting the leader after losing power is bound to be a harsh experience.

2. Introduction to the Dataset

As part of this study, we created a dataset on the fate of certain leaders after they were exiled. The subjects of this dataset—a total of 91 cases—were all leaders who went into exile after political upheavals between 1970 and 2014. For the selection of these leaders, we basically relied on Archigos, a systematic dataset on political leaders (Goemans et al. 2009).¹ The dataset on exile already exists

¹ According to Archigos, there are 85 leaders whose “post tenure fate” is “exile” and “exit” is “irregular” among those who lost their power between 1970 and 2014. Based on this, we have checked each case in detail and have also compared them with the existing dataset on political changes to determine the number of cases as follows. First, we added four cases in which “exit” is coded “regular” by Archigos, but can be regarded as irregular leadership changes due to the treatment by Powell and Thyne (2011), Diamond (2020), and Beissinger (2013), and the actual political process of the cases: Yanukovych (Ukraine, 2014), Yingluck (Thailand, 2014), Compaore (Burkina Faso, 2014), and Honecker (German Democratic Republic, 1989). Next, we added three cases where the “post tenure fate” was not “exile,” but could be regarded as exile in substance: Aristide (Haiti, 1991), Cabral (Guinea-Bissau, 1980), and Somoza (Nicaragua, 1979). Similarly, we excluded three cases with the “post tenure fate” of “exile” that could not be considered to have been exiles in a substantive sense: Haidalla (Mauritania 1984), Jonathan (Lesotho, 1986), and Najibullah (Afghanistan, 1992). Finally, we added two cases that are not covered by Archigos but can be regarded as irregular forms of loss of power and exile: Gary (Grenada, 1979) and Mancham (Saychelles, 1977).

(Escriba-Folch and Krčmaric 2017), and it mainly covers data on the country of exile. Nevertheless, in this paper we collected data on items related to their fate subsequent to their exile. Given this, we present the specific results pertaining to each of the items in this section.

First, they can be divided into four major groups, with the first one consisting of data pertaining to the exiled leader's treatment and activities during their exile. In regard to the activities of the exiled leader, we investigated whether they were able to wield some political influence over the home country from the country of exile² and also whether following the exile, they were able to continue as the head of whatever political party they had belonged to prior to exile. Next, we investigated whether some change occurred in the country of exile as a method to determine whether the country of exile treated the exiled leader well. This was because we considered cases in which the leader was put in a position in which they were forced to change the country of exile as it was not a "good exile." Finally, we investigated whether the leader was subjected to legal action or pardoned in their own country in order to discover the home country's stance toward the leader after their exile.

The second group consists of data pertaining to the return of the leader to their home country after their exile. Here, while we naturally investigated whether the leader was able to return to their home country and how many days it took before they could return, we also investigated whether the return home was allowed by the home country, it was without the permission of the home country, and if their return was related to a change in the political regime of the home country.³ This was not simply an investigation into whether the leader returned to their home country or not; rather, it allowed the comprehensive collection of data pertaining to the background that enabled the leader's return.

The third group consists of data pertaining to the leader's activities and treatment after returning to their home country in cases in which this was possible. Specifically, we investigated whether the leader was able to return to a political positions such as political leader, cabinet minister, head of a party, or a similar position.

Data were collected from a variety of sources, including press materials (international and local)

² Although the existence of political influence is an ambiguous concept, this paper uses the following criteria to determine it. We considered a leader to have exerted political influence when the political activities of the exiled leader led to substantive reactions by supporters in their home country or the new government. Examples include direct negotiations with the new government, giving instructions to supporters in the home country to stage a coup attempt, and intervening in elections. On the other hand, exiled leaders often criticize the new government through the media or call for an anti-government struggle; yet, if the new government or its supporters do not react to such actions, they are excluded. In some cases, relatives of the leader remain in the home country and engage in political activities, but unless the involvement of the exiled leader himself was observed, it was not considered a case of exerting political influence.

³ Specifically, we coded a return to the home country associated with either a change of government (with a change of leader) or a regime transition (with or without a change of leader) as "1." That is, if a regime transition—such as democratization—occurred, we coded the return as "1" even if the leader did not change before or after the transition. In contrast, if an election was held outside of the regime transition but the leader did not change, we coded the return as "0."

that can be collected mainly in the Lexis/Nexis database, the Archigos codebook, research by Lentz (1994), and case-specific secondary materials.

3. Descriptive Analysis

In this section, we present an overview of the trends obtained from our dataset to show that variations exist in their subsequent fate after exile.

3.1 Return to home country

We argue that the major factor which determines whether the exile becomes a good or a bad fate is the propriety of returning home. This is because the issue of returning to the home country is important to exiled leaders and at the same time, it allows the researcher to observe the issue in a comprehensive manner. For example, Pascal Lissouba, who was expelled from Republic of the Congo in 1997, had longed to return to his homeland for more than 22 years before dying in exile in France. In contrast, Thailand's Prime Minister Chatchai Choonhavan, ousted in the 1991 coup d'état and exiled to Britain, successfully returned home just five months later. Naturally, there are cases in which an exiled leader has no desire to return to their home country, such as Ali Nasir Muhammad Husani of South Yemen and Jorge Serrano Elías of Guatemala. However, there are very few cases of this nature. So, in this regard, we discuss what factors influence whether a leader can return home after exile or whether they can return home after only a short time in exile.

Figure 1a represents the proportion of exiled leaders who returned home out of 91 leaders who were exiled from 1970 to 2014—the period covered in this paper. As this data shows, 58% of them returned to their home country. If we exclude those still in exile, 68% of them returned to their home country and 32% died in exile as Figure 1b shows.⁴ We tend to think of “exile” as implying that a leader is nearly permanently barred from returning to their home country. However, in reality, it has been found that well over half of those who go into exile return to their home countries. In this sense, exile is far less of a “punishment” than is conventionally imagined.

⁴ In fact, only two of those who died in exile were assassinated; Juan José Torres, ousted from Bolivia in a coup in 1971 and purged in Peru under Operation Condor; and Somoza, exiled to Paraguay after the Nicaraguan Revolution and killed in Operation Reptile.




Figure 1a Exiled leaders who returned home




Figure 1b Exiled leaders who returned home except for those still in exile

Next, if we limit our investigation to the 53 leaders who returned to their home countries after exile, we can represent it with Figure 2a. This presentation is a scatter plot diagram that shows the years of exile on the horizontal axis and the number of days until their return to their home country on the vertical axis, which allows for better visualization of the distribution of data. The average amount of days is 2,416, and the standard deviation is 2,303. The shortest is one day in the case of Ovando Candia, who defected to the Argentine embassy for a day after the 1970 coup in Bolivia, and the longest is the case of Goukouni Oueddei of Chad, who fled to Libya after being defeated by rebels in 1982, spending 9936 days in exile. Thus, it is evident that even among the cases in which repatriation was successful, there was a wide variation in the number of days it took to return.




Figure 2a Number of days for exiled leaders to return to home

In addition, Figure 2b shows a similar scatter plot with the degree of human rights abuses committed by exiled leaders during their tenure on the vertical axis.⁵ Generally, existing studies have pointed out the impact of human rights abuses by exiled leaders during their office on their exile. Therefore, we created this plot in order to confirm the relationship between the two; notably, we can also say there are numerous variations in the plot. In other words, there is no indication that leaders who have not violated human rights to any significant degree are more likely to go into exile, or that the degree of human rights violations during the tenure of exiled leaders has decreased since the late 1990s, as previous studies have suggested (Krcmatic 2020).

⁵ The data on human rights violations were taken from the Political Terror Scale (PTS), a representative dataset; while the PTS has several indicators, this paper uses the PTS-S (PTS: State Department), which has the fewest number of missing values. It quantifies the degree of human rights violations on a 5-point scale from 1 to 5 (5 being the worst and the lower the number, the better). Shown in Figure 2a are the average values of each leader's score during his/her tenure.




Figure 2b Degree of human rights abuses by exiled leaders while in office

Furthermore, we investigated the proportion of the way to return home as a supplement. Accordingly, Figure 3 shows that more than 70% of returned leaders could return home with permission from their homeland. In other words, after exile, it would be difficult for a leader to return home unless they are allowed by their home country.




Figure 3 Return to home with permission

3.2 Treatment after return

Whether or not exile can be called a good fate will depend not only on whether exiled leaders were able to return home as well as how they were treated after their return. Figure 4 shows the result of our investigation of the post-return treatment of leaders. It indicates that 58% of these leaders were reinstated in public offices, and an additional 19% of them were reappointed to heads of state out of a total of 53.

For example, Nino Vieira, the Guinea-Bissau president, is the one of reappointed leaders. Vieira,

who rose to power in 1980, was exiled to Portugal in May 1999 after being defeated in a civil war (*BBC News*, May 8, 1999). The Bissau-Guinean Congress enacted a law that granted amnesty to Vieira in March 2005; given this, Vieira returned home two months later. Subsequently, Vieira then ran for and won the presidential election in June 2005 and was eventually reappointed to the head of state.

This shows that it is not unusual that exiled leaders come back to public office after exile even if they were once forced into exile. As for this point, the tendency in our dataset also amends the harsh image of exile in general.




Figure 4a Reinstated in public offices




Figure 4b Reappointed to the head of state

3.3 Life in exile

In the end, we intend to show that styles of exile are diverse during the exile. In this regard, Figure 5 shows the proportion of exiled leaders who exerted political influence during the exile or not. Our dataset also identifies that almost half of the leaders wielded their political influences from their host countries.

For instance, Francois Bozize, the president of the Central Africa Republic, was the exiled leader

who wielded influence on his homeland. Bozize was ousted by opposition forces in the 2004 civil war, then he was later exiled to Benin. In due course, Bozize put pressure on the homeland government to permit his return; hence, he formed a political organization in Benin and cooperated with regional leaders in his homeland.

In addition—as shown in Figure 6—it can be assumed whether the exiled leaders exerted their influences, thereby confirming if they continued to be heads of political parties after they were exiled. The chart indicates that one-quarter of exiled leaders remained as the heads of their political parties.




Figure 5 Exerting influence




Figure 6 Remained as the heads of their political parties

Moreover, we can gauge whether the exile was a blessing or not from other perspectives, except for the influence exerted. The perspectives are indicated in Figure 7, Figure 8, and Figure 9. Accordingly, Figure 7 shows the proportion of the exiled leaders who were prosecuted in their homelands. The exiled leaders can hardly return to their homeland if they are prosecuted. We expect, given this indicator, this makes life in exile pitiable. We can then determine only one-third of exiled leaders were prosecuted in their exile.




Figure 7 Prosecuted in home country

On the contrary to the prosecution, granting amnesty leads the exiled leaders to come back to their homeland, which means good fate. Figure 8 shows whether the exiled leaders were granted amnesty or not. Notably, 18% of exiled leaders were pardoned by their homeland government.




Figure 8 Granted amnesty

Lastly, we investigated whether the exiled leader changed their destination or not. The exiled leaders often change their host country when they are ill-treated or anxious about their life in exile. Figure 9 shows the proportion of the exiled leaders who changed their host countries or not. The chart reveals that roughly one-third of exiled leaders changed their host countries while two-thirds of them stayed in their first host country.




Figure 9 Change the host country

Conclusion

The existing studies have categorized exile as one of the punishments being lumped in with other fates such as execution—notwithstanding its heterogeneity. Moreover, the studies have featured the exile in a short time span, although they presented it as one of the post-tenure fates. This paper then actually constructed the new original exile dataset.

The dataset revealed that exile cannot be a sweeping punishment; also, it is extremely varied. So, one of our forthcoming tasks is to identify the factors which determine the diverse types of exile.

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