A Note on Adverse Selection and Bounded Rationality

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Takeshi Murooka*
Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University

Takuro Yamashita†
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse

Abstract: There is accumulating evidence that some consumers are behavioral in the sense that they may make suboptimal decisions. This paper investigates adverse selection with general types of such behavioral biases. In our model, some buyers (i.e., consumers) may take actions that do not necessarily optimize own payoffs, which encompass virtually any type of biases including subjective probability, framing, model misspecification, random errors, and inferential naivety. We focus on a situation in which there exists severe adverse selection where only no-trade outcome is possible under rational agents. We show that the no-trade theorem remains to hold without imposing any additional assumption on buyers' behavior. That is, if there is any trade under a mechanism which is incentive compatible for sellers, then the expected payoff from the trade is negative (i.e., ex ante individual rationality constraint is violated) for some type of buyers. Our result sheds light on a new trade-off between social surplus and payoff losses of boundedly-rational buyers.

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* Email: murooka@osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp
† Email: takuro.yamashita@tse-fr.eu
Adverse selection with general behavioral types

Takeshi Murooka*   Takuro Yamashita†

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1 Introduction

There is accumulating evidence that some consumers are \textit{behavioral} in the sense that they may make suboptimal decisions.\footnote{See Heidhues and Kősze
gi (2018) for evidence on consumer behavior and Beshears, Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2018) on household decision makings.} This paper investigates adverse selection with general types of such behavioral biases. In our model, some buyers (i.e., consumers) may take actions that do not necessarily optimize own payoffs, which encompass virtually any type of biases including subjective probability, framing, model misspecification, random errors, and inferential naivety. We focus on a situation in which there exists severe adverse selection where only no-trade outcome is possible under rational agents. We show that the no-trade theorem remains to hold without imposing any additional assumption on buyers’ behavior. That is, if there is any trade under a mechanism which is incentive compatible for sellers, then the expected payoff from the trade is negative (i.e., ex ante individual rationality constraint is violated) for some type of buyers.

*Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University. murooka@osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp
†Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse, Capitole. takuro.yamashita@tse-fr.eu
Because rational buyers never wish to trade whenever their expected payoff is negative, our theorem implies that generating trade is possible only with permitting losses of behavioral buyers. Our theorem does not pose a limit on the social surplus, however. For example, Murooka and Yamashita (2020) extensively investigate adverse-selection problems when some buyers have inferential naivety (Eyster and Rabin, 2005; Jehiel, 2005). Murooka and Yamashita (2020) derive an incentive-feasible mechanism, in which rational buyers (as well as naive buyers) trade even under severe adverse selection, and the condition for the social surplus to be strictly higher under the mechanism. In this sense, our theorem sheds light on a new trade-off between the social surplus and payoff losses of behavioral buyers.

2 Severe adverse selection with rational types

A seller has private information, denoted by $\theta \in \Theta$, about the goods to be traded. The distribution of $\theta$, denoted by $F \in \Delta(\Theta)$, is assumed to be common knowledge. A buyer has no private information. A (deterministic) trading outcome is denoted by $y \in Y$, which may include the information as to which goods are traded, the associated monetary transfers, and so on. The seller’s ex post payoff is denoted by $u_S(y, \theta)$, and the buyer’s ex post payoff is denoted by $u_B(y, \theta)$. The trading outcome includes a “no-trade outcome” $y = 0 \in Y$, and we assume $u_S(0, \theta) = u_B(0, \theta)$ for normalization. A feasible allocation is a stochastic trading outcome, denoted by $x \in \Delta(Y)$. For each $i \in \{S, B\}$, let $u_i(x, \theta) = \int_y u_i(y, \theta)dx$ denote the expected payoff given $x$.

A fundamental observation in the literature (Akerlof, 1970; Samuelson, 1984) is that adverse selection can be so severe that only no-trade outcome is incentive feasible (i.e., incentive compatible for the seller, and individually rational for both parties) by rational traders. Our goal is to obtain a different but related observation in case the buyer is not necessarily rational in the standard sense.

Specifically, consider an allocation rule $(x(\theta))_{\theta}$ that satisfy:
• (IC$_S$) incentive compatibility for the seller: for any $\theta, \theta'$,
\[
    u_S(x(\theta), \theta) \geq u_S(x(\theta'), \theta),
\]

• (IR$_S$) individual rationality for the seller: for any $\theta$,
\[
    u_S(x(\theta), \theta) \geq 0,
\]

• (IR$_B$) individual rationality for the buyer:
\[
    \int_\theta u_B(x(\theta), \theta) dF \geq 0.
\]

**Assumption 1** (Severe adverse selection). An allocation rule $(x(\theta))_\theta$ satisfies (IC$_S$), (IR$_S$), and (IR$_B$) if and only if $x(\theta) = 0$ for ($F$-almost) all $\theta$.

**Example 1.** The seller has an indivisible object. A deterministic trading outcome specifies whether the trade of the object occurs and the associated monetary transfer from the buyer to the seller. Both parties are risk neutral in monetary transfer, and hence, an allocation is identified by a pair $x = (q, p) \in [0, 1] \times \mathbb{R}$, where $q$ represents the probability of trading the object and $p$ represents the expected monetary transfer from the buyer to the seller.

The seller’s ex post payoff is given by $u_S(q, p, \theta) = p - q\theta$, where $\theta \sim U(0, 1)$ can be interpreted as the seller’s opportunity cost of trading. The buyer’s ex post payoff is $u_B(q, p, \theta) = q\alpha\theta - p$, where $\alpha\theta$ can be interpreted as the buyer’s valuation for the object. Assume $\alpha \in (1, 2)$.

By the standard argument based on the envelope theorem, the combination of (IC$_S$) and (IR$_S$) implies:
\[
    p(\theta) \geq q(\theta)\theta + \int_\theta^1 q(z)dz.
\]

Then, the buyer’s expected payoff is at most:
\[
    \int_0^1 \left( q(\theta)\alpha\theta - q(\theta)\theta - \int_\theta^1 q(z)dz \right) d\theta
    = \int_0^1 q(\theta)(\alpha - 2)\theta d\theta,
\]
which is negative unless $q(\theta) = 0$ for almost all $\theta$. 

3 Severe adverse selection with behavioral types

Eyster and Rabin (2005) show that some trade becomes possible if the buyer is “cursed” in that she underappreciates the relationship between other players’ actions and these other players’ information. Under such a behavioral bias, the total surplus in the society can be higher than with no trade. However, the buyer makes a loss in such a case. Murooka and Yamashita (2020) consider a generalized environment of Eyster and Rabin (2005) where the buyer is either a cursed type or a rational type (i.e., a standard Bayesian type). They show that the trades between the cursed buyer and the rational seller as shown in Eyster and Rabin (2005) generates positive externalities to others: there exists a mechanism in which the rational buyer trades with the seller even under severe adverse selection. The rational buyer earns non-negative (and sometimes strictly positive) expected payoff, while the cursed buyer still makes a loss.

Although those two papers consider very specific behavioral types, we show that the same property occurs under any kind of behavioral types. Namely, some buyer type must make a loss unless it is a no-trade mechanism.

To formally state our main result, let $k = 1, \ldots, K$ denote the buyer’s behavioral type, where $g_k \in (0, 1)$ denotes the probability of each type $k$. We assume $\theta, k$ are independent, which means that the buyer’s behavioral type is not informative about the seller’s value.\footnote{We think this is a natural assumption. However, generalization to the correlated case is also possible, as long as we strengthen the seller’s incentive compatibility and individual rationality to their ex post version. This strengthening is in order to avoid a Cremer-McLean type mechanism, which extracts the seller’s information rent by asking the seller to bet on the buyer’s type realization.} Let $x(\theta, k)$ denote the allocation if the agents’ types are $(\theta, k)$. For the seller, we require:

- $(IC_S)$ incentive compatibility for the seller: for any $\theta, \theta'$,

\[
\sum_k g_k u_S(x(\theta, k), \theta) \geq \sum_k g_k u_S(x(\theta', k), \theta),
\]

\[
\sum_k g_k u_S(x(\theta, k), \theta) \geq \sum_k g_k u_S(x(\theta', k), \theta),
\]
• (IR$_S$) individual rationality for the seller: for any $\theta$,

$$\sum_k g_k u_S(x(\theta, k), \theta) \geq 0.$$ 

We say that buyer type $k$ makes a loss if $\int_\theta u_B(x(\theta, k), \theta)dF < 0$. A key assumption is that the buyer’s payoff of any type $k$ does not directly depend on $k$ — the buyer’s payoff is evaluated based on a single measure, which corresponds to the payoff of the rational type.

**Theorem 1.** Suppose that an allocation rule $(x(\theta, k), (\theta, k))$ satisfies (IC$_S$) and (IR$_S$). Then, unless $x(\theta, k) = 0$ for all $k$ and ($F$-almost) all $\theta$, some buyer type makes a loss.

*Proof.* We show a slightly stronger claim: If an allocation rule $(q(v, k), p(v, k))$ satisfies (IC$_S$), (IR$_S$), and makes the buyer’s *ex ante* expected payoff (i.e., the buyer’s expected payoff before realizing own type) non-negative, then $q(v, k) = 0$ for all $k$ and ($F$-almost) all $v$.

Specifically, the buyer’s *ex ante* expected payoff is:

$$\sum_k g_k \left( \int_\theta u_B(x(\theta, k), \theta)dF \right).$$

Define $x(\theta) = \sum_k g_k x(\theta, k)$ for each $\theta$. Then, (IC$_S$) becomes:

$$u_S(x(\theta), \theta) \geq u_S(x(\theta'), \theta),$$

(IR$_S$) becomes:

$$u_S(x(\theta), \theta) \geq 0,$$

and the buyer’s *ex ante* expected payoff becomes:

$$\int_v u_B(x(\theta), \theta)dF.$$

Therefore, by Assumption 1, if the buyer’s unconditional expected payoff is non-negative, we must have $x(\theta) = 0$ for ($F$-almost) all $\theta$, implying $x(\theta, k) = 0$ for all $k$ and for ($F$-almost) all $\theta$.  

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Theorem 1 points out a fundamental problem of an adverse selection environment. Namely, whatever decision rules of the buyer one introduces in order to avoid the no-trade outcome, such avoidance is possible only at the risk of some buyer types, or more precisely, at the risk of the buyer’s ex ante payoff.

Notice that we have little restriction on which kinds of behavioral types we consider. It includes any type of misinference (Eyster, 2019), inattention (Gabaix, 2019), random errors such as Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey (2008) and Gabaix, Laibson, Li, Li, Resnick, and de Vries (2016), or heterogeneous priors for the value. There may exist multiple kinds of behavioral types coexisting, with possibly different degrees. Theorem 1 is also agnostic about the class of mechanisms and the equilibrium concept, as long as the seller is best-responding. For example, non-dependence on mechanisms allows for framing-based biases and model misspecifications such as Ahn and Ergin (2010), Spiegler (2016), and Esponda and Pouzo (2016).

References


