Explaining the Undemocratic Results of Democratic Revolutions:

The Necessity and Rationality of Democratic Slogans

May 2, 2018

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【Keywords】 democratic revolution, post-revolution, democratic stagnation, electoral fraud

【Abstract】 Why democratic revolutions do not always result in democratization? Existing research suggest a “semblance” of democratic revolution leads to a stagnant democratization: since the participants of the revolution are not committed to democratic values in the first place, there are no advances in democratization after the revolution. However, these works have significant shortcomings. First, the question of why the slogan of democracy is adopted although democratic values are not sought out has not been clarified. Second, post-revolution analysis of how it will affect politics thereafter has been overlooked. To fill these gaps, we point out three strategic rationalities and necessities behind the semblance: (1) organizing large scale dissident movements in a country; (2) attracting international support; and (3) imitating successful examples from the past. Further, we focus on the phenomenon whereby fraudulent elections in the post-revolution period are tolerated by citizens, even though they protested against the fraudulence at the time of the revolution. The results will hamper a shift in the source of legitimacy from a revolution to democracy, thereby lead to a stagnated democratization. Evidence from the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia supports this theory.

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1. Introduction

This paper considers the effect of democratic revolutions on democratization. “Democratic revolution” is a relatively new term and phenomenon. Revolutionary research has been around in political science for a long time. Revolution is often defined as “rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and class structures accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below”\(^1\), with researchers basically referring to “revolution” as political change resulting from conflict among classes, involving a large number of people participating in violent, short-term movements\(^2\). The Chinese and Cuban revolutions are typical examples.

Since the 1980s, a new type of revolution has started to occur\(^3\). Centered in urban areas, these are based on non-violent methods including protests and demonstrations\(^4\), with much of these falling outside the definition of conventional revolutions. A representative example is the 1986 People Power Revolution in the Philippines. In response to the outbreak of this new type of revolution, Goldstone put forth a broader definition, suggesting this was “an effort to transform the political institutions and the justifications for political authority in a society, accompanied by formal or informal mass mobilization and non-institutionalized actions that undermine existing authorities”\(^5\). The democratic revolutions considered in this paper are categorized as such new types of revolution. Thompson defined democratic revolutions as “spontaneous popular uprisings which people topple unyielding dictators and begin a transition process which leads to the consolidation of democracy”\(^6\). As mentioned above, this is characterized by the main participants being urban residents and, in addition to being non-violent, these movements can be summarized as involving demands for democratic reforms, as well as the denunciation of fraudulent elections or coups.

In this paper, we do not concern ourselves with clarifying factors that contribute to the success or failure of democratic revolutions. We do not explore the conditions under which revolutionary forces cause governments to fall. Naturally, large numbers of citizens entering the streets to demand democracy does not always result in the existing system being overturned. Mass protests and demonstrations sometimes result in regime change but, sometimes, such efforts are suppressed and fail to topple the existing system, such as in China in 1989, and Myanmar (then known as Burma) in 1988. In this sense, naturally the question of just what kind of protests by common people leads to the overthrowing of authoritarian regimes presents an intriguing topic and, indeed, there have been studies on the so-called “democratization from below”. However, in this paper we do not seek to consider the success or failure of revolutions on this basis. Rather, we take up the question of whether the new regime created after the fall of an authoritarian regime will be democratic or not.

Intuitively, one would think that a democratic regime would follow a democratic revolution, as the people have carried out demonstrations that call for democracy and have actually succeeded in banishing a dictator. Logically, the regime that follows certainly cannot be a dictatorship. However, in reality it has been pointed out that cases exist where democratic revolutions have not resulted in democracies\(^7\). Specifically, the so-called Color Revolutions\(^8\) of Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004) and Kyrgyzstan (2005), as well as the Arab Spring that occurred in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011\(^9\) are perfect examples of this.
Following revolutions in these countries, no democratic institutional reforms were carried out, excessive power was concentrated in the president, the power of the former regime was restored after the revolution, elections were found to be fraudulent, the media was not independent, corruption increased, the rule of law was inadequate, civil liberties were restricted, opposition parties had weak parliamentary powers, and similar characteristics were identified.

So, generally, what is the relationship between democratic revolutions and democracy? First, consider how the Democratic Index changed before and after democratic revolutions. To that end, we must first identify what examples of democratic revolutions exist; that is, we need to settle on a universe of democratic revolutions. To date, attempts to list democratic revolutions are limited to Thompson (2004) and Beissinger (2013). We therefore comprehensively sampled democratic revolutions referencing both. Table 1 shows the difference in degree of democratization between the year previous to the revolution and one year after the revolution using the Polity IV score, which is an index of democracy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Year</th>
<th>Pre-Revolution</th>
<th>Post-Revolution</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>-7</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phillipines (1986)</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Korea (1986–87)</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania (1987)</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia (1989)</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bulgaria (1989)</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Benin (1989–90)</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nepal (1990)</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt (2011)</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Democratic revolutions and the progress of democratization.

Summarized in this manner, with regards to the cases of Georgia, the Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan amongst the chain reaction of system changes referred to as the Color Revolution and Egypt for the Arab Spring, we can see that the degree to which democratic revolutions brought about democratization was limited. This is consistent with the fact that it has been pointed out in existing research that the Color Revolution and Arab Spring did not produce democratization. On the other hand, other democratic revolutions saw
fundamentally significant progress in democratization. While amongst these there is the case of the Sudan, where four years after revolution, there was a coup d'état that led to regression back to an authoritarian system, immediately after the revolution a democratic administration was indeed established.

Therefore, some democratic revolutions bring about dramatic democratization, while others—like the Color Revolution and Arab Spring—do not. The latter amongst these is enigmatic and requires analysis. Why do large-scale protests obstinately aimed at democratization not result in democratic systems despite the fact that they have toppled authoritarian regimes? In other words, in the present paper, we pose the question of why democratic revolutions do not always result in democratization.

Consequently, in this paper we concentrate on the semblance of democratic revolution. In other words, because the entities that participated in the revolution were not committed to democratic values in the first place, it is claimed that there were no advances in democratization after the revolution. However, there are inadequacies in existing research, so it is not possible to answer the question of why some democratic revolutions do not bring about democratization. First, the question of why the slogan of democracy is adopted despite the fact that democratic values are not sought out has not been clarified. In other words, the rationality or necessity of semblance has not been clarified. Second, post-revolution analysis is inadequate. That is to say, as democratic revolutions are all about semblance, the point of view on how it will affect politics thereafter has collapsed. In this paper, we felt it necessary to clarify these two points to answer the above question.

2. Prior Research

Why do some democratic revolutions not produce democracies? Unfortunately, there is not much prior research available on this point. First, as background to this question, there is debate on the point of whether limited social movements involving non-violent participation, such as democratic revolutions, can even be categorized as “revolutions” in the first place. Second, research to date has almost without exception concentrated on exactly which cases lead to the overthrow of existing regimes. Because it assumes a binary confrontational dependent variable that addresses whether an existing regime can be toppled or not, post-revolution research has been insufficient. Third, although abundant research on individual democratic revolutions exists, there is little in the way of cross-sectorial or theoretical inquiries.

Nonetheless, there have been studies that address the questions presented in this paper. Much present research has been carried out from the viewpoint of why the Color Revolution did not produce democracies. First, the most frequently identified factor is the weakness of civil society. Because civil society was weak and divided, it was not able to counter situations where power was concentrated in the president after the revolution or corruption became prevalent.

Second, there were institutional factors at play. More specifically, it is often mentioned that institutional design results in power being concentrated excessively in the president. Accordingly, those seeking concessions tend to congregate around the president, so checks and balances are not effective, making authoritarian rule possible. In addition, institutional factors such as weak legislative power and political parties that are inequitable and lack transparency also promote such trends. Third, we have international
factors. It has been pointed out that international factors such as support from the US and the EU were important in the success of the Color Revolution\textsuperscript{15}, but involvement by the West declined after these revolutions\textsuperscript{16}. Considering revolution as the endpoint rather than the starting point of democratization, the US and EU did not continue to support democratization post-revolution.

Summarizing the above studies, although the parties to the revolution— or at least the citizenry and some elites— were fulfilling democratic values and attempting to build a democratic system, we see that this was not realized due to structural obstacles of one type or another. On the other hand, research exists suggesting that actors participating in the revolution, including citizens, were not pursuing democratic values\textsuperscript{17}. Referred to as a “semblance of democratic revolution” by Beissinger (2013), this ultimately only involved the outward appearance of a democratic revolution, and in fact there were no demands for democratization; all that existed was dissatisfaction with the current administration due to poverty and social inequality. The same can also be said of the Arab Spring, where the people who participated in the revolution were not so much dissatisfied with non-democratic governance as they were with the economy\textsuperscript{18}.

Thus, there was only the appearance of democratic revolution as presented by a negative coalition of groups dissatisfied with the government. This is why, following these revolutions, the coalitions, which consisted of groups with a wide range of preferences that did not share democratic values, faced dissolution, leading to political stagnation.

Related to this, Howard and Walters (2015) point out the existence of a “democratic bias”: while we know that uprisings of the people do not necessarily lead to democratization and, despite the fact that citizen mobilization is not necessarily inspired by democratic norms, the media, researchers, and the policy makers of other countries tend to arbitrarily frame these movements as “democratic revolutions.” Indeed, the media depicted the Color Revolution and Arab Spring in a most positive light, describing them as “non-violent movements seeking democracy”\textsuperscript{19}, while researchers early on framed the Ukraine’s Orange Revolution as an example of a movement pressing for democratization\textsuperscript{20}. Moreover, in May 2005 US President George W. Bush visited Tbilisi, Georgia to take in the Revolution of the Roses and stated that it should serve as a future precedent for the Caucasus and Central Asia\textsuperscript{21}, while President Barack Obama described the protests in Egypt as an “expression of people’s ‘pent-up frustration’ with the lack of meaningful reform in the country”\textsuperscript{22}. In other words, there is a certain bias in the sense that observers also tend to see popular uprisings as “democratic revolutions.”

Studies that used such methods as interviews with citizens who wholly participated in the revolutions, as well as public opinion polls, to claim that the parties were not seeking democracy revealed the motivation or internal aspects of the entities participating in the revolution. Through social surveys, such attempts are highly valued for the fact that they empirically demonstrate a lack of commitment to democratic values. Based on the results of empirical research, this paper shares a common ground for seeking out reasons for democratic revolutions that do not result in democracy due to a lack of commitment to democratic values. However, the present research has significant shortcomings, in that it does not clarify why democratization was demanded in these revolutions despite a lack of support for democratic values. When it comes to movements involving the large-scale participation of citizenry that result in governments quickly falling, it
is by no means uncommon for these to not result in democracies. Therefore, there have been numerous revolutions that have not advanced democracy. Looked at simply, the question is if, for example, an economic recession or high unemployment rate is the main cause of frustrations, is this enough to fuel demonstrations? Just how can we understand this head-scratching phenomenon of revolution in the name of democratization despite the fact that no democratic values are pursued? Prior research cannot answer this. Below, we will first consider this matter both theoretically and hypothetically.

3. Theory: The Necessity and Rationality of Democratic Semblance

Why do principals who are disappointed with their current governments and thus motivated to participate in revolution promote democracy in these revolutions? As noted in this paper, we believe that this has something to do with rationality and necessity. We argue, factors that cannot avoid taking on the form of democratic revolutions exist, as does the pretext that it is easier to overthrow an existing regime by taking on the form of a democratic revolution, and that these serve to encourage “sham” democratic revolutions. This is why, after toppling a regime, democratic values are no longer pursued and democratization becomes stagnant.

So, what is the necessity of all of this? We want to point out three things here. First, the framing of a “democratic revolution” is a positive influence on the mobilization of citizens in the anti-government movement. In the research of social movements, it has been argued that, with framing, a function for forming a collective identity of “us,” who share common values, and “them,” who do not, as well as a function for clarifying justices and injustices on the government side exist\(^23\). The utility of this is also important in the context of the democratic revolution.

It has been argued that the various actors participating in the revolution in fact form a negative coalition whose only common point is a loose dissatisfaction with the current government\(^24\). In such cases, the dissatisfaction felt with the government is hardly uniform, because there is such a large degree of variation in preferences, it is by no means natural that these individuals would come together to demonstrate\(^25\). As such, seen from the point of view of the anti-government elite that mobilizes the citizenry, this lacks the symbols necessary to bring together a diverse range of citizens. Looking back on the history of revolutions, symbols that unite citizens include ideologies such as communism (China, Vietnam, Cuba) and religions such as Islamic fundamentalism (Iran)\(^26\). In contrast, in a democratic revolution, democracy is considered to function as a symbol for mobilizing a diverse coalition of citizens. In other words, forming a collective identity built around pursuing democracy leads to smoother mobilization and organization.

Furthermore, the framing of a democratic revolution also functions to censure the injustices of the present regime. In other words, by framing the existing administration as “a powerful dictatorship” opposed to “we who pursue democracy,” lends legitimacy to a movement. This in turn provides the revolution with a moral foundation.

The statement above is the domestic rationale for implementing dissident movements; second, there is a need to appeal to the international community to gain support. After the Cold War, democracy was given normative values in the international community, and the US, EU, and other powers began to adopt
policies for promoting democratization. Specifically, this support for democratization came with a large price tag, and democratic governance, democratic reversals of coups and the like were sought as conditions of aid. Given such a set of circumstances, it is important to tout democracy even when rising up to topple the government. In addition to providing material support for NGOs and similar organizations, it was very important for the US and the EU to express public support for these revolutions. This is because, in addition to contributing to the justification of the movement itself and encouraging citizens to mobilize even more, this had the effect of deterring violent repression from the ruling power.\(^2\)

In this way, in the sense that promoting specific values draws support from foreign countries, when it comes to international rationale, these are also similar to revolutions that have occurred in the past. In other words, in the era of the proxy wars of the Cold War period, when there were actual confrontations between ethnic groups, in order to gain the support of the US or Soviet Union, it was of the utmost strategic importance to align the movement with either “individualism” or “communism.” Thus, even in the case of a local conflict, it was necessary to give semblance to ideological conflicts. Therefore, we understand democratic revolutions to have a similar composition.

We have observed that, for successful revolutions, advancing democracy is strategically useful domestically and internationally. So now, as a third reason for advancing democracy, we need to illustrate international influences. It has been pointed out that international influences affected the Color Revolution and Arab Spring.\(^2\) The democratic revolution that occurs in one country feeds revolution in others. As a mechanism of this, the first instance is recognized as a successful case and is imitated. Successful revolutions spread as a type of modular.\(^2\) Accordingly, if the population was mobilized to topple the regimes in Serbia, Czechoslovakia, and Tunisia—which are successful precedent cases—in the name of democracy, even if democratic values are not pursued in other countries, strategic considerations involving the validity of democratic revolutions are established and spread.

In addition, with regards to the Color Revolution it is also important that this modular takes the form of an “election revolution.” In other words, we have an innovative set of coordinated strategies and tactics that used elections to mobilize citizens against semi-authoritarian incumbents.\(^3\) There is a certain rationality in inciting demonstrations against election irregularities. During revolutions, crowds become problematic. Regularly held elections, on the other hand, are highly predictable and, because preparations can be carried out in advance, these provide people with a single focal point, and are thus useful in overcoming the issue of crowds.\(^4\) Given this state of affairs, election revolutions are recognized as an effective strategy and have consequently spread. Also, as revolutions triggered by election fraud, inevitably these will have to take the form of democratic revolutions.

Above, we have summarized the necessity and rationality of taking on the form of a democratic revolution even when not pursuing democratic values. I would like to call your attention to the first and second of these three necessities, which are thought to be mechanisms that were especially prevalent in the international community following the Cold War. It was after the Cold War that democracies acquired normative values in earnest.\(^5\) Accordingly, whether acting as a symbol bringing diverse powers together in a given country, or acting to gain the support of the international community, it was after the Cold War that
democracies first began to acquire normative values in earnest. Following the Cold War, therefore, it has become harder to transform regimes by revolutions that are not democratic revolutions. The end of the Cold War and the accompanying normative fluctuations surrounding democracy converged to transform revolution into democratic revolution.

4. Case Study: 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia

In this section we examine the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia as a case study to demonstrate that the semblance of democratic revolution: (1) is effective in organizing large scale dissident movements in a country; (2) is effective in attracting international support; and (3) involves the imitation of successful examples from the past. The case of the Rose Revolution is selected for three reasons. First, the Rose Revolution has been widely viewed as a typical case of democratic revolution. It was triggered by a massive electoral fraud of the ruling party, and Georgian citizens’ mass demonstrations calling for democracy finally succeeded in getting rid of the then-president Edward Shevardnadze. Second, the Rose Revolution provides an appropriate case to examine the rationality behind the semblance of democratic revolution and its effect on democratic governance, since it was the opposition themselves that framed the Rose Revolution as a democratic revolution. Throughout the revolution, protest leaders repeatedly appealed democratic value to the citizens so as to expand the size of the demonstration. The protests’ leader Mikheil Saakashvili declared in the climax of the revolution “There is a bloodless, democratic, peaceful, velvet revolution going on in our country.”

Following the statement, the framing of the “democratic Rose Revolution” rapidly spread to the media. In this regard, we can exclude the possibility of “democratic bias” in the case of Rose Revolution. Third, the Rose Revolution remains relatively underexplored in the literature, although it is regarded as a representative example of democratic revolution. This is because existing empirical research has resorted primarily to the social survey method, and therefore has focused exclusively on the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine on which plenty of social survey and public opinion polls has been done. Therefore it would be empirically valuable to illuminate the political process of the Rose Revolution and its aftermath.

4.1 Framing for Revolutionary Movements and Effect to Mobilization

In the evening of the 2003 parliamentary elections which triggered the revolution, Georgian opposition parties were divided by their positions toward Shevardnadze, and competing with each other for votes rather than forming a common front against the ruling party, Citizens’ Union of Georgia. Of the four main opposition parties, the competition between National Movement-United Front (NM) led by Saakashvili and Burjanadze Democrats (BD) led by Nino Burjanadze and Zurab Zhvania were particularly intense due to their personal relationship. Saakashvili, for example, criticized the opposition stance of Zhvania right before the November parliamentary elections, saying “If the President calls Zhvania tomorrow, he will run without hesitation and stand with him. This is the conclusion I have made as a result of [my] relations with him.”

The lack of unity in the opposition persisted even after the exposure of an electoral fraud. When the
Central Electoral Commission (CEC) began to release its fraudulent numbers, the NM wanted the CEC to recognize its victory since exit polls and the Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) both showed the NM had won the election, whereas the BD who positioned in distant third among opposition parties did not want to acknowledge the result and called for new elections. After the NM and BD agreed to form the coalition and began protest calling for the resignation of Shevardnadze, Burjanadze herself articulated that she was not calling for Shevardnadze’s resignation and was only demanding that ballots be recounted or that the vote be invalidated in Georgia’s most controversial election districts. In this regard, a real picture of the revolutionary movement was a negative coalition among different classes with diverse preferences, united primarily by their common rejection of the incumbent regime.

Therefore, protesters had to integrate the revolutionary movement into a unified opposition and make the mobilization and organization smoother. A member of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) admits that the popular understanding of the Rose Revolution with hundreds of thousands of people coming to the streets in support of a unified opposition was, to a great extent, the narrative the revolutionary government encouraged. The actual size of the demonstrations were not more than fifteen thousand in the first ten days or so, therefore many participants in fact feared the demonstrations would dissipate after a few days. Under such circumstances opposition began to use the framing of democratic revolution, in order to enlarge and maintain the revolutionary movements as a unified opposition.

Revolutionaries in fact did not actively employ the slogan of democratic revolution from the beginning of the protest movement. After Saakashvili became the primary leader of the demonstrations, he took an approach of stimulating Georgian nationalism to mobilize people. For example, Saakashvili conducted a march to Tbilisi from Zugdidi, the birthplace of Merab Kostava, the leader of independent movements against Soviet Union, and Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the first president of Georgia, to appeal to the people’s memory of state building.

However, as the mobilization grew, opposition leaders began to put forward the democratic value of the revolution. When the Defense Minister declared that the situation “has really turned uncontrollable,” Zhvania described the circumstances as “People are really desperate…They understand if they miss this chance…then whatever can be considered democracy in Georgia would be over.” Similarly, Burjanadze criticized that the regime’s election fraud “just crosses out Georgian democracy.” In response to these critics Shevardnadze camp also countered by referring to democracy: “It’s very important to change a president by means of election and not by revolution” and otherwise we “cannot build up a democratic country.” As such, democratic values came to emerge as a focal point of the revolution.

Also, as the revolution proceeded, protest movements began to emphasize the contrast between “we who pursue democracy” and “those who espouse dictatorship.” On the one hand, protesters appealed to citizens to rally under the flag of democracy, claiming that “We will not accept the death of democracy in Georgia, we will not accept the Parliament that was appointed rather than elected, we will not accept stealing of the votes and we will not accept the ballot fraud” and “Whole Georgia should stand up for our rights.” On the other hand, protesters depicted Shevardnadze camp as a “post-Soviet dictator who ignored the will of his people” and “all those bandits” “…will step down like Slobodan Milosevic,” who was ousted in
2000 Bulldozer Revolution. Based on this dichotomy, protesters censured the regime’s injustice in tarnishing democracy and legitimacy, claiming that “These [election] results are illegitimate…It is a coup by the dictator Shevardnadze.”

Protesters’ such framing of a democratic revolution effectively prompted mobilization and organization of a negative coalition of diverse citizens, as we can find its influence in the participants’ discourses. For example, Mukhti (charge), a keyword spread throughout the revolutionary process, indicates that a unification grew inside the protest movements. According to participants, Mukhti implies a feeling of “uniting,” “we are together…Everybody feels the same things together, in a same situation.” Such a perception of mass togetherness among participants was created by skillful framing by Saakashvili; “Saakashvili always connects. People feel connected with him, together, the same. Mukhti is created from this unity, from feeling together.”

Participants also revealed that Saakashvili and other leaders’ critics on the regime’s injustice, had a major effect on their decision to join opposition movements, by taking advantage of the election fraud. Before that, “people had always thought, “what could overthrow them?” In this regard, opposition leaders “knew how to say what people needed to hear,” and effectively censured the regime’s injustice, claiming that “look, the government has falsified the elections and we must defend our votes.” According to participants, “This was the point from which we could make a revolution and kick out that government,” and “If not for…Saakashvili and others coming out and telling people “look what the government doing with you, what it has done with your votes, with your constitutional right to vote,” then maybe we would have swallowed this…”

4.2 International Appeal

The second rationale behind the semblance of the democratic revolution is an appeal to international community to gain support for protest movements. First, protesters had to gain material supports from the international community, especially from the EU and the US. In the growing tide of democratic promotion after the end of the cold war, the pro-western Shevardnadze administration had enjoyed enormous financial support from the west in the name of democratic assistance. Indeed, since the mid-1990s Georgia has received more money per capita from the US than any other post-Soviet countries, and it ranked second only to Israel with respect to US aid.

Such material supports for democracy from the west contributed to the success of the Rose Revolution. For instance, the exit poll and the PVT conducted on the polling day was funded by the US-based NDI and the Soros Foundation. The Soros Foundation also financially supported various anti-government movements, such as creating the Georgian student-based NGO Kmara which took initiative in the revolution, and connecting Kmara members and opposition political leaders to Otpor activists in Serbia to develop their skills in the demonstration, and backing domestic monitoring effort by civic groups such as International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy and Georgian Young Lawyers Association.

The pressure from the Bush administration at the time indicates that these assistance to revolutionary movements in fact aimed towards democratization. In January 2003, Bush sent a letter to Shevardnadze,
demanding to “provide fair and free coming to the power of the new generation of leaders after 2003 and 2005 elections.” Also in July 2003, former Secretary of State James Baker met with Shevardnadze and proposed a formula for representation of the various parties on the electoral commissions at each level. Under such circumstances, revolutionaries had a strong incentive to characterize the revolution as a process to western countries’ beloved democratization.

The second merit for opposition to appeal the democratic value internationally is to get the moral legitimacy of being supported by international community, thereby making mobilization smoother. For instance, a statement by the International Election Observation Mission, issued on the next day of the polling, concluded that the elections “have regrettably been insufficient to enhance the credibility of either the electoral or the democratic process.” Also, when the final election results were released by the CEC, State Department spokesman Adam Ereli clarified the position of the US, stating: “We are deeply disappointed in these results and in Georgia's leadership…The results do not accurately reflect the will of the Georgian people but instead reflect massive vote fraud.”

These official supports from the west contributed greatly to the mobilization. In response to the US government’s accusation against the electoral fraud, the size of the mobilization of the revolution dramatically increased, with thousands of cars of protesters marching toward Tbilisi, demanding Shevardnadze’s resignation. Citizens surged into the Freedom Square with US national flags in their hands, indicating the influence of obtaining an endorsement from the US on the legitimacy of and citizens’ decision to participate in the demonstration. After the revolution there was a billboard erected in downtown Tbilisi with the words “Thank you, USA” on it.

Thirdly, international appeal helped revolutionary movements by deterring the regime’s violent repression. For instance, US Department of State repeatedly called on all sides to “refrain from the use of force or violence.” Revolutionary movements used such external pressures to illegitimate the regime’s violence, criticizing that “The US seeks for peaceful resolution of the current crisis. We want the same, but Shevardnadze is the one, who seeks for opposite, destabilization and civil confrontation.”

Such an approach to abstain the regime from using force indeed contributed to the peaceful resignation of Shevardnadze in the final stage of the revolution. When Shevardnadze declared state of emergency and more than 10,000 troops faced off against opposition supporters, US Secretary of States Colin Powell and UN Secretary General Kofi Anan urged Shevardnadze to peacefully work with the opposition. The international call for restraint led Defense Minister as well as military and police commanders to declare that they would not use force against their fellow citizens. As a result of the expectation of a “bloodless revolution” fostered by external deterrence effect, the mobilization reached to around 25,000 protesters, a part of which stormed into parliament and made Shevardnadze accept his resignation.

Shevardnadze himself pointed out that “the coup was prepared over several months, everything was thought through in advance and everything was built on one idea—Shevardnadze won't spill blood.” Thus, under circumstances of “even beating demonstrators with rubber sticks would sound like violence against democracy,” the things moved forward from the perspective that the regime would not use force against the protesters.
4.3 International Influences

Thirdly, the revolutionary movements of the Rose Revolution recognized the Serbian Bulldozer Revolution in 2000 as a successful precedent case and tried to emulate their method of mobilizing citizens in the event of electoral fraud. That is, since successful model for them took the form of an electoral revolution, their protest movements were also necessarily promoted under the cause of democracy.

Already in 2002, leaders of the opposition were seriously taking account of the resignation of Shevardnadze by “Serbian scenario,” frequently contacting Serbian activists in order to learn how to organize mass protest movements. In April 2003, Georgian student-based NGO Kmara was established under the financial support of the Soros Foundation. Kmara was obviously modeled after Serbia’s Otpor; their strategies were similar, targeting politically apathetic urban youth, and organized in leaderless, horizontal structure.

Thus the revolutionary movements, of both elites and citizens, obviously emulated the electoral revolution method of Serbian Bulldozer Revolution. They carefully planned to develop the anti-government movements at the timing of elections in which the fraud was expected. In May 2003, when the regime obstructed acceptance of the new election code regarding the composition of the CEC, opposition regarded these efforts as regime’s preparation for effectively rigging the vote. Saakashvili later stated that “If you had asked people in opinion polls in June, “Would you go out on the street to demonstrate if needed?” 90% of them would have responded that they would not have gone out on the street no matter what happened.” Indeed, the protest against government resistance to reforming the CEC did not trigger widespread demonstrations at the time. Also, several other protests in the period leading to the 2003 parliamentary elections, such as a student-led demonstration of several thousand against the government’s pressure on the independent television channel Rustavi-2 in October 2001, did not enlarge any further. That is, the revolution did not happen spontaneously; political elites carefully prepared and effectively used the scheduled elections as a focal point to solve the collective action problem inherent in a revolution.

As observed above, the Rose Revolution was purposefully framed as a democratic revolution to make it easier to overthrow the existing regime. That is, behind the semblance of “democratic Rose Revolution” there were strategic rationalities and necessities in mobilizing a diverse negative coalition of citizens, gaining public support from the international community to justify the movement and thereby deter violent repressions from the ruling power, and emulate the successful precedent cases of electoral revolution.

5. Post-revolution: Tolerance of Electoral Fraud

This paper has presented the necessity and rationality of uprisings as democratic revolutions, even in cases where there is no effort to pursue democratic government, empirically demonstrating through case method the functioning of these types of mechanisms. Now we will analyze the time periods that followed the overthrow of revolutionary and authoritarian regimes. For cases of democratic revolutions that do not involve the pursuit of democratic values, we will clarify the mechanisms by which one can observe
whether democracy has taken hold or not. In so doing, the present paper focuses on the phenomenon whereby fraudulent elections are tolerated by citizens.

What is of utmost importance here is that there be a shift over to normal politics once the revolution ends via free and fair elections. This is because this produces the first steps towards legitimacy. Directly following a revolution, the fact that the administration has been toppled by an outside force or by some other non-constitutional means becomes a source of legitimacy itself. However, in order to realize a democratic administration, efforts must be made using legitimate procedures to transform the source of legitimacy into access to authority. Thus, there must be a shift to a system where those selected as a result of equitable and fair elections become legitimate rulers. For example, in the Philippine revolution of 1986, the People Power movement overthrew the Marcos regime and on February 25, 1986 Corazon Aquino assumed the office of President, but this was only the beginning of democratization. Through the competitive elections that were carried out thereafter, taking advantage of the legitimacy provided by selection via a democratic process, Aquino was able to consolidate political power after overcoming a power struggle with the military.

In this sense, irregularities occur in elections, and if citizens tolerate these, the results will lack the most fundamental conditions for realizing democratic governance. Also, in a democratic revolution that is nothing more than semblance, because the citizenry does not seek democratic values, but rather participates in the movement solely out of dissatisfaction with the current administration. After the revolution fraudulent elections will likely be tolerated. As a result, without any transformation of legitimacy to a free and impartial election, the fact that a revolution has occurred will forever continue as a source of legitimacy, with power concentrated with the president and informal clientelism networks gaining importance.

This paper covers the Georgia election of 2004 based on awareness of the above issues. Soon after the resignation of Shevardnadze, Georgian presidential elections were held in January 2004, and a revolutionary leader Saakashvili was elected with overwhelming majority, gaining around 96% of the total votes. Regarding the quality of the election, OSCE observers criticized “the lack of truly competitive political environment” and “the political imbalance in the composition of the election administration.”

First, since the rival candidates declared “boycott,” none of the major political parties presented candidates besides the NM and BD, thus “offering no choice to the electorate” and therefore the election process “may not be desirable as precedents for future elections in Georgia.” Second, election commissions were composed of the ruling parties enjoying a dominant position, and consequently, two-thirds of the CEC were appointed by the revolutionary government.

Two months later, the parliament elections were held in March 2004 and National Movement-Democrats (NMD) led by revolutionary leaders won 135 out of 150 seats. According to the OSCE report, “developments during the post-election period, posed a challenge to the integrity of election results in some districts.” First, the tabulation of results was marred by many irregularities, such as the “negotiation” of the results by members of the election administration. Second, voter turnout showed “a number of anomalous or implausible results,” such as implausible turnout in excess of 100%. Third, the
CEC selectively cancelled the results in some districts in “legally questionable” procedures. Overall, the quality of two founding elections held in post-revolution Georgia were highly questionable. Certain NGO members also pointed out that the extremely high results did not suggest these elections were free or fair either. Therefore, in both cases opposition parties criticized the election fraud by Saakashvili camp and declared not to accept the election results. For example, after the presidential election, a leader of the Labor Party Natelashvili criticized that he would not recognize Saakashvili as the president, and that Saakashvili’s coming to power was “unfair and immoral.” Similarly, after the parliamentary elections, the leader of the Democratic Union for Revival Aslan Abashidze claimed that the NMD rigged the election by buying votes, and refused to recognize the result, along with the Labor party.

Despite these critics by opposition leaders, however, there was no demonstration or protest movement against the election fraud in Georgia at this time. Compared with the mass protest against the Shevardnadze regime’s election fraud just few months before, Georgian citizens’ reaction was surprisingly calm, even though Saakashvili’s seizure of power was consolidated with more than 95% of the vote, and even though Saakashvili said that he did not “see the point of having any opposition deputies in the national parliament.” They welcomed the new president Saakashvili and a landslide victory of the NMD, laying their hopes for solving various problems such as poverty, unemployment, and corruption. A former deputy of the ruling party who split with Saakashvili described the post-revolution political environment stating that “a democratic revolution led to this anti-democratic situation and now we have something between Russia and Turkmenistan.”

Under such circumstances, Saakashvili, who now became “a state builder first and a democrat second,” began to consolidate the presidential power. It was symbolized by the constitutional amendment in February 2004, through which the president gained the power to dissolve Parliament, and the right to dismiss and appoint the newly created position of Prime Minister. Under this “superpresidential” system, Parliament became an implementer of executive initiatives and the electoral laws were amended six times between 2004 and 2008, to magnify the dominance of the leading party.

As illustrated above, the fraudulent founding elections were tolerated by Georgian citizens, who did not pursue democratic values but successfully overthrew the government through the semblance of a democratic revolution. As a result, in the post-revolution Georgia, the source of legitimacy did not shift from the revolution to democracy, hence leading to the stagnant democratization. In this sense, the appeal of democratic values which led the revolution success, was not useful anymore for political leaders in the post-revolution political situation, as indicated in the Saakashvili’s discourse in legitimizing his position. During the revolution period, Saakashvili portrayed himself as an embodiment of western democrats, stating that “I was really raised on American democracy, not only my studies but much more…For me, the closest thing in terms of political orientation is John McCain. We're very close.” However, the image of the western democrats in Saakashvili’s discourse dissipated after the revolution. Instead, Saakashvili began to compare himself with founding fathers such as David the Builder, Ben Gurion, De Gaulle, and Ataturk. That is, Saakashvili chose a new symbol of nationalism rather than democracy in consolidating his power.
in the post-revolution political environment.

The Georgia Public Opinion Barometer, a survey conducted in 2006, indicates that the legitimacy in post-revolution Georgia remained in the memory of the revolution and did not shift to the democratic one\(^9\). According to the survey, a majority of the respondents did not consider Georgia democratic (only 24.7% did consider Georgia democratic). This is worse than 2003 when the Rose Revolution occurred (46.6%). Further, 77.0% thought that a lay person cannot exert any influence on decisions, and 70.9% felt that equality under the law was not observed in Georgia. Despite these stagnation of score regarding democracy, however, the biggest share in trust in state institutions was the president (43.7%). That is, the revolutionary leader Saakashvili still gained the trust of Georgian citizens without any transformation of legitimacy to democracy.

The tolerance of election fraud by citizens after the semblance of democratic revolution such as this stand in stark contrast with the post-revolution process of democratic revolutions by citizens who genuinely pursue democratic values. For example, in 1990 Bulgaria parliamentary elections, which were held right after the Bulgaria revolution of 1989, as many as 100,000 opposition supporters marched in the capital city of Sofia, calling for fresh elections to be held. Similarly, in the founding elections after the Philippine revolution of 1986 and the June Democratic Movement of 1987 in South Korea, opposition parties held demonstrations accusing the government of election fraud.

These protest movements against the founding elections could be seen as a genuine demonstration seeking democratic values, since it is hard to assume that dissatisfaction against a revolutionary government heightened rapidly in such a short period of time and expressed as a semblance of democratic revolution. In contrast to these genuine democratic revolutions, in the cases of a democratic revolution that is nothing more than semblance, as observed in the Rose Revolution in Georgia, citizens who do not pursue democratic values tend to tolerate the post-revolution election fraud. As a result, semblance of democratic revolution hamper a shift in the source of legitimacy from a revolution to democracy, thus leading to a stagnated democratization.

5. Conclusion

“Revolution” refers to the phenomenon whereby a regime is overthrown in a very short amount of time. The question of exactly what kind of political process follows is an extremely important subject in comparative politics. Given an awareness of these types of issues, in this paper we have revealed political mechanisms by which democratic revolutions that do not produce democracies occur. This paper argues that, even if it does not involve the pursuit of democratic values, the strategically rational act of posing as a revolution calling for democracy: (1) is effective in organizing large scale dissident movements in a country; (2) is effective in attracting international support; and (3) involves the imitation of successful examples from the past.

These mechanisms empirically demonstrated in the case of the Rose Revolution in Georgia above could be applied to other democratic revolutions as well. For example, we can find out strategic rationalities and necessities behind the semblance in the Orange Revolution of 2004 in Ukraine. First, regarding the
domestic rationale in organizing large scale protest movements, there was a surprising degree of diversity among the participants in the Orange Revolution, among basic issues such as favorable economic system and NATO membership\textsuperscript{95}. Therefore, throughout the revolution process protest leaders emphasized the contrast between “revolutionaries who seek democracy” and “the regime who hamper it,” thereby criticized the regime’s injustice to smoothen the mobilization. For example, opposition leader Yushchenko declared his election would be a victory of democracy, and denounced the regime “who would cheat (on the election)” as “like cockroaches.”\textsuperscript{96}

Second, protesters in the Orange Revolution received official support from the international community by calling for democracy. When the irregularities in the election were exposed, the EU and the US quickly articulated their critics on the rigged election\textsuperscript{97}. At the final phase of the revolution, US Secretary of State Collin Powell and Polish President Aleksandr Kwasniewski discouraged the regime from the use of force during the standoff between Ukrainian armed forces and Orange revolutionaries\textsuperscript{98}, leading the crisis to a peaceful settlement\textsuperscript{99}. Opposition leaders participated in the standoff also admitted that these external interventions were useful in providing moral support\textsuperscript{100}.

Third, the Orange revolutionaries had necessities in setting a goal of democracy in order to imitate successful electoral revolutions in the past. Orange protesters indeed repeatedly made contact with activists in Serbia and Georgia to learn the strategies such as “making a democratic appeal to politically neutral or insufficiently informed voters,” and “rallying society in the event of electoral fraud.”\textsuperscript{101} Campaign leaders of the leading opposition party Our Ukraine also prepared to mobilize demonstrations in the event that the election fraud would be likely\textsuperscript{102}.

So far, we have demonstrated the rationalities and necessities of semblance in the case of the Color Revolution. Now we would like to briefly examine the applicability of our theory to other democratic revolutions, using the Tunisian Revolution of 2010 which triggered the subsequent Arab Spring as a case study. Participants to the Tunisian Revolution consisted of heterogeneous category in terms of their religion, job, region, and so forth\textsuperscript{103}. Therefore, from the perspective of Tunisian General Union of Labor who took initiative of the anti-government movement, it was essential to overcome the diversity of participants’ preference to make a success of revolution. This is why Tunisian revolution which started as a demonstration calling for nothing more than economic reform, came to appeal to the civil rights and criticize the regime’s corruption under the slogans of “Bread, dignity, and social justice,” “Work is a right, O you gang of thieves.”\textsuperscript{104}

In addition, Tunisian revolutionaries framed the revolution as democratic in order to get the international support, thus lowering the risk of a violent repression by the regime. For protesters, the US democratic promotion in the Middle East, in particular President Obama’s June 2009 Cairo speech which reinvigorated US pro-democratic stance, set expectations that the US would support democratic revolutions everywhere\textsuperscript{105}. President Obama indeed proclaimed his support for the protest movement during the revolution process, referring to the principle of democracy\textsuperscript{106}. Also, the US ambassador to Tunis, Gordon Gray, informed Ben Ali that he had to leave power, and that he could not count on exile to the United States\textsuperscript{107}. 

These supports from international community contributed to deterring the regime’s suppression as well. EU High Representative Catherine Ashton and Commissioner Štefan Füle, for instance, called for restraint in the Tunisian Revolution that sought democratic values; “We want to express our support and recognition to the Tunisian people and their democratic aspirations…In this regard, we urge all parties to show restraint and remain calm in order to avoid further casualties and violence.”

After that, Tunisian armed forces began to refuse to follow the regime’s order to crack down on revolutionary movements, which contributed greatly to the success of the revolution by lowering the risk of a much bloodier scenario.

Hyde (2011) points out that after the Cold War, even non-democratic countries came to look like democracies, at least in an institutional sense. Following the Cold War, the same thing occurred with regards to revolutions: even if a revolution did not actually call for democracy and was simply born out of dissatisfaction with the present regime, a necessity and rationality born out of appearing as a democratic revolution was generated.

Furthermore, we highlight that the phenomenon of tolerance for fraudulent elections can be seen as a feature of the “post-revolution politics” of democratic revolutions that do not actually seek democratization. For example, even if protests break out at the time of the revolution in the wake of fraudulent elections, such behavior will no longer be seen with regards to election irregularities post-revolution. In the sense that it does not bring about a shift in the source of legitimacy, this definitively harms post-revolution democratization.

We cannot assume that democratization will spring forth out of a democratic revolution. Quite naturally, there will be no democratization unless the people of the country demand democracy. In post-revolution politics, the extent of fraud in elections and the reaction of citizens to such phenomenon will constitute an important touchstone.

Notes

1 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 4.
5 Goldstone, p. 142.
6 Mark Thompson, Democratic Revolutions: Asia and Eastern Europe (London; New York: Routledge, 2004), 1.


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11 Thompson, p. 3

12 Tudoroiu.

13 Hale.


17 Beissinger, 2013.


20 Adrian Karatnycky, “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution”, *Foreign Affairs*. 84 (March/April 2005), 35-52.


30 Wolchik, p. 64.


34 *The Times*, November 22, 2003.


39 Mitchell, 2009, p. 63

40 Ibid.


42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.


51 Ibid, 70-98.

52 Ibid, 88.

53 Ibid, 88.

54 Ibid, 88-89.


58 “Georgian Parliamentary Elections Marred by Confusion over Voter Lists,” *The International Election Observation...


71 Devdaliani, p. 104.


73 Thompson, p. 122.

74 *Ibid*, p. 27.


77 *Ibid*, pp. 6-8.


79 *Ibid*, pp. 20-21


95 Beissinger, 2013, pp. 582-583.

96 *The Times*, November 2, 2004.


100 Ibid.


102 McFaul, 2007, pp. 63-64.


107 Schraeder and Redissi, p. 13.

108 European Union, “Joint Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton and Commissioner Štefan Füle on the


109 Schraeder and Redissi, p. 15.